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INTELLECTUAL AND INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL
THoMAs G. FIELDS, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
It has always been popular to put complicated legal subjects
in nutshells, but let-it be said at the outset that this article is not
for the individual who has spent time wandering in the intellectual
and industrial property thicket. Broad approaches to this subject
matter have been tried before, and the degree of their success has
been quite directly proportional to substantive scope and inversely
to length.' Insofar as this is both as broad as the most comprehen-
sive and the length of the shortest, several observations are in
order.
First, intellectual and industrial property is property-
extremely valuable property at that.' However, this is not a sub-
ject that gets more than passing attention in many curricula, and
none in most. Consequently, few lawyers, aside from the specia-
lists, know much about it. Moreover, unlike most areas of legal
specialization, such as tax, labor, and antitrust law, the basic prin-
ciples of which are known to most general practitioners, if a gener-
alist knows anything about literary or industrial property, it is apt
to be wrong.' Furthermore, because clients tend to approach
*A.B., 1964, and J.D., 1969, West Virginia University; LL.M., 1970, New York
University; Associate Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center; Member of the
bars of West Virginia and Ohio.
I Two good, short articles are: Martin, What to Advise Before Calling the
Intellectual Property Specialist, 7 L. NoTEs 119 (1971); Pretty, Industrial Processes
and Formulas: Special Considerations for the Lawyer in Protecting Them, 8 L.
NoTEs 91 (1972). For an excellent piece with considerably more detail see Note,
Unfair Competition Protection after Sears and Compco, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 101
(1965).
' J. CRmBEr, PpmNcnLEs OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 4 (1962). There, Dean Cribbet
observes in part: "Thus analyzed, it will be seen that property can exist in relation
to an infinite number of things. . . .It is just as true, but less obvious, that...
patents, trademarks, copyrights, and even good will can be brought within the ken
of property." But cf. Mr. Justice Holmes' comment in E.I. duPont de Nemours
Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917): "The word "property" as applied
to trade-marks and trade secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary
consequences of the primary fact that the law makes some rudimentary require-
ments of good faith."
3 See, e.g., P. GOLDSTEIN, PREFACE TO COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DocrmNEs (1973).
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generalists first, substantial and incurable injury may result from
a generalist's mistaken notions of literary and industrial property
law. Avoiding such injury is one of the objectives of this article.
Second, most of the mystique surrounding literary and industrial
property is wholly unjustified. While its acquisition may some-
times be more complicated than the acquisition of some other
kinds of property, intellectual and industrial property can gener-
ally be transferred and protected like other property. Most of the
mystique in this area dissolves with the acquisition of a working
vocabulary; such a vocabulary can be set forth in short order.
Third and finally, it is hoped that this article can be used to inte-
grate the subject of literary and industrial property into more
widely known areas of law.
11. THE BASIC VOCABULARY
What is "intellectual and industrial" property? It is the rights
arising from and concerning: (1) the physical expression of ideas
and (2) the good will acquired in the operation of a business. As
with other types of property, these valuable rights originate with
the state.' A large segment of this law is governed by federal stat-
utes; an equally important part is governed by both common law
and state statutes.
The manner by which intellectual or industrial property is
acquired varies according to its sub-classifications. In some types,
ownership can vest only in the inventor, or the creator of the
property; in other types, ownership is acquired by the first to claim
ownership, in much the same way as title to wild animals is ac-
quired.
The law governing the transfer and protection of these forms
of property is similarly varied. Literary or industrial property is
usually transferred by contract, although it may also be trans-
ferred by gift, bequest, or interstate succession.5 Moreover, it may
be protected by actions in tort or contract, as well as by the crimi-
nal process.
A. Patents and Copyrights
There are three reasons for discussing patents and copyrights
E.g., J. CRmBET, supra note 2.
DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). See also Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REy. 383, 414 (1964).
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first: (1) they are almost exclusively governed by federal law be-
cause of a specific provision in the United States Constitution;6 (2)
they are probably the first to come to mind when one considers
protection of intellectual or literary property; and (3) they are the
subject of some of the most serious and damaging legal misunder-
standings among the public and the general bar.
In brief, there are only three basic kinds of patents. In order
of the greatest number granted, the types of patents are: (1) the
utility patent; (2) the design patent; and (3) the plant patent. The
utility patent is what is uniformly meant when the word "patent"
is used without more, and will be so intended when "patent" is
used without qualification in this article. All types of patents allow
the patentee to prevent others from making, using, or selling the
subject of the patent for the duration of the grant.
A utility patent protects the inventor of a novel machine,
industrial process, composition of matter, or article of manufac-
ture. Although the categories of inventions protectible by utility
patent overlap somewhat, and the outer limits of this patent pro-
tection have been the subject of considerable litigation, relatively
clear-cut examples of the above classes of utility patents suffice for
purposes of this brief study. The examples are respectively: a
motor, a process of tempering steel, nylon, and a toothbrush. In
contrast with utility patents, design patents protect the appear-
ance or shape, rather than function, of articles of manufacture.
Articles that may be proper subjects of design patents include soft
drink bottles or chairs. The subject of plant patents has little to
do with either of the foregoing; plant patent protection is limited
to certain novel asexually propagated plant species.'
Copyrights may be contrasted with utility patents. A copy-
right generally affords protection of original means of expressing
an idea; a utility patent protects novel means of its implementa-
tion. A copyright allows its "proprietor" to prevent the copying
(and, in some instances, the performance) of that expression. It
may be noted that to the extent that copyright protects perform-
a U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 provides: "The Congress shall have power ... to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discover-
ies." For an analysis of the above provision see Marmorek, The Inventor's Common-
Law Rights Today, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 369, 376 (1968).
There are no animal patents. But cf. Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 2321-583 (1970).
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ance, the nature of its protection resembles patent protection.8 The
subject matter of a copyright, however; is fairly distinguishable
from that which may be protected by patent; a copyright is gener-
ally available for literature, photography, music, drama, and
sculpture.
While both patents and copyrights will be discussed in more
detail, two further points need underscoring. First, an imporant
distinction between patents and copyrights exists: copyright pro-
tection arises automatically upon inscription of a notice of claim
upon a work when the work is first reproduced for sale; it is not
until later that the claim is filed by the proprietor. But patent
protection does not arise until the patent application has been filed
with and approved by the patent office; a patentee has nothing
until his patent issues after a lengthy and complex examination
process. Second, when the terms "patent" and "copyright" are
used, they properly refer only to rights acquired exclusively by
virtue of federal statutory law.'
B. Trademarks
Whereas copyright protection and patent protection are avail-
able for concrete expressions of or implementations of ideas, trade-
marks may be used to protect the good will of a business. Patents
and copyrights depend entirely on acts of creation: one must be the
originator or inventor to acquire such protection. Trademark pro-
tection depends exclusively upon being the first to claim use of a
mark, whether or not original, to distinguish the source of a prod-
uct in commerce. Of course a trademark may be invented by the
one desiring to use the mark as a commercial label, and fanciful,
original marks are probably superior for advertising purposes, but
the right to use a mark does not depend upon inventorship; rather,
the right is usually acquired in pretty much the same way as own-
ership of wild animals: the first to take "possession" acquires the
superior right.
Unlike patents and copyrights, trademark rights are not ex-
clusively acquired by federal statute. While there is a federal stat-
ute," it is based on the broad power of the commerce clause; and
8 See, e.g., Muller v. Triborough Bridge Authority, 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); but see Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934).
17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970).
Cf. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1970).
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such protection is therefore limited to interstate transactions.12
Consequently, state statutory and common law are important
complements to interstate protection of trademarks, and this law
exclusively governs marks that are used only in intrastate com-
merce.'
3
C. Unfair Competition Law
"Unfair competition" is a term of art; it is probably more so
than any other term. In other words, it does not mean what the
words literally suggest. The term is sometimes abused, even by
specialists, but as properly used, unfair competition law refers only
to an area of common law underlying the trademark law. It should
be used exclusively to refer to common law enforcement of integ-
rity in indicating the source of goods or services in commerce."
Thus, unfair competition law applies, for example, to a situation
where one company "palms off" its goods as those of another, and
where, for one reason or another, a state or federal statutory trade-
mark is not directly involved.15
It bears emphasis that the law of "unfair competition" is
much narrower than the term implies. On the one hand, it is to be
distinguished from other private law generally preventing busi-
nesses from competing unfairly with one another. On the other, it
is to be distinguished from public law of the same type that is
oriented toward direct protection of the consumer and the public
rather than protection of a specific business."6
£2 See, e.g., Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
"See, e.g., In re Taylor, 133 U.S.P.Q. 490, 491 (Pat. Off. Tmk. Trial & App.
Bd. 1962); Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. Strickland, 407 F.2d 881, 888 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
1 This is a trifle argumentative, but a failure to use precise terminology breeds
serious problems. For example, two years ago, two congressional bills were being
considered by two subcommittees of a single, small committee (402) of the ABA
PTC Section. One carefully distinguished "unfair competition" from the "law of
contracts, or confidential or proprietary information of trade secrets." S. 643, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1965). The other defined acts of unfair competition to include
those that "result or [are] likely to result in the wrongful disclosure or appropria-
tion of a trade secret or confidential information." S. 647, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. §
43(a)3 (1965).
15 For an excellent general discussion, see Note, Unfair Competition Protection
after Sears and Compco, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 101 (1965). See also Developments in
the Law: Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68 HARv. L. Rxv. 814 (1955). *
," The most generic of these is § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970), which makes "unfair methods of competition ... unlaw-
ful." See Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971). See also, Pep Boys v. FTC, 122 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1941).
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D. Trade Secret Law
Trade secret law, at least in terms of subject matter, is state
law quite similar to patent law. Trade secret law renders tortious
the unlawful use by another of secret know-how or other informa-
tion used in one's business that gives one an advantage over busi-
ness competitors who do not know or use such information."
Trade secret law is especially valuable because it protects sub-
ject matter that is not eligible for patent and copyright protection.
But unlike patents and copyrights, however, trade secret law does
not confer a monopoly, legal or otherwise. Although actual use of
the information in a business is currently necessary to qualify for
trade secret protection, "trade secret" probably should apply to
information that has a commercial value, whether or not it is being
used commercially. It should afford protection to an individual
who properly attempts to sell information not yet converted to
commercial use to an ongoing business; but as yet unauthorized
conversions of trade secrets have been treated as contract prob-
lems, rather than actions in tort.'"
Unlike patents and copyrights, there is no time limit on trade
secret protection. This makes good sense when one considers that
trade secret law only prevents someone from converting
information that belongs to another. Unlike patent law, trade se-
cret law does not protect the original discoverer of that information
from independent, subsequent discovery or derivation of that in-
formation by another. In other words, it only prevents the second
party from obtaining the information by stealing, breach of confid-
ence, bribery of key employees, or other unlawful means,"9 and
within those parameters, there is no basis for conflict between
patent and trade secret law.2"
'1 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
Is E.g., Downey v. General Foods Corp., 37 App. Div. 2d 250, 323 N.Y.S.2d 578
(1971), rev'd. 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972). Compare
Tabor v. Hoffman, 119 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889), and E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971).
" E.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 119 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); W.R. Grace v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9 (6th Cir.
1968).
2 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974); compare Sears, Roe-
bucA & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco Corp. v. Day-brite Lighting,
Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
[Vol. 77
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E. Literary Property
Literary property is separately discussed because some states
apply the term to their common law equivalent of copyright law.
As mentioned above, federal statutory copyright protection gener-
ally arises only upon publication of a work. Literary property law
fills the gap between the time of creation and publication. Aside
from some differences in classification of subject matter, the law
of trade secrets and literary property are the same.'
F. Other State Protection
There are a variety of other rights and remedies under state
law that may loosely be said to involve intellectual and industrial
property. Not surprisingly, interference with rights in this area, as
in the more traditional property areas, may generate criminal lia-
bility.2 There is little rational distinction between stealing money
and stealing information that is worth money, aside from the ob-
vious problems of proof of ownership and of taking.
Similarly, as has been noted, contract rights may be primarily
involved and may be enforced by the usual legal and equitable
remedies.2
Finally, aside from conversion, there are a variety of tradi-
tional torts that fall, more or less, in this area, such as interference
with contract, interference with business by picketing illegally, or
slander and libel. Although these areas of recovery are sufficiently
well-known to be largely ignored here, it will do well to keep them
in mind as the substantive law is surveyed in the following sec-
tions.
III. PATENTS
The word "patent" is an abbreviated form of the term "letters
patent" and most broadly represents an exclusive license from a
governmental body. An early form of patent in the United States
was a land grant patent to railroads conferring upon them the
exclusive and unlimited right to certain tracts of land as incentive
21 See, e.g., Downey v. General Foods, 37 App. Div. 2d 250, 323 N.Y.S.2d 874
(1971), rev'd 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).
2 E.g., OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1333.51 (Page Supp. 1973).
2 E.g., Downey v. General Foods, 37 App. Div. 2d 250, 323 N.Y.S.2d 578
(1971), rev'd 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).
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to lay track across a growing country. 4 Unlike land grant patents
which were unlimited in duration, the types of patents to be dis-
cussed here are strictly of limited duration." From the date of
issue, the duration of patent protection depends upon the kind of
patent issued: (1) utility patents are effective seventeen years;" (2)
plant patents, seventeen years;" and (3) design patents, at the
option of the applicant prior to issue, are effective three and one
half, seven or fourteen years. 2 All patents are non-renewable
grants.
The most widely accepted rationale for these grants is similar
to the purpose of the old railroad land grants-to provide an incen-
tive to invest in the research and development necessary to achieve
measurable improvement in our standard of life. In return for that
investment, a party successful in making an innovation acceptable
under the standards of the patent laws is rewarded by the right to
use, produce, or perform the subject matter of the patent
exclusively for the duration of the patent, even though someone
else may later come up with the same innovation. A patentee is
thus said to have a "legal" monopoly. A legal monopoly should be
distinguished from an "economic" monopoly since a great many
patents are so-called "paper" patents and are never put to com-
mercial use. Although this distinction is widely ignored, it is one
for the generalist to consider when he is confronted with a client
who wishes a patent.
A. Acquiring the Patent
The focus of this section will be on utility patents. The proce-
dure for acquiring all patents is similar although the standards of
eligibility for a patent may vary in material respect depending
upon the type of patent sought. As mentioned above, there are four
kinds of utility patents defined in the statute.8 Unless one can
bring the subject matter of a proposed patent within one or more
of the statutory categories a patent application will be properly
denied. For example, mental processes and methods of doing busi-
24 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
2' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970).
27 Id.; id. § 161.
- Id. § 173.
29 Id. § 101. See text accompanying note 7.
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ness, have been held not to be the proper subject matter of a utility
patent."
Assuming that a party is the original inventor of subject mat-
ter proper for a utility patent, he must first file a patent applica-
tion." Only the inventor, his heirs, or assignees can file an
application; the discoverer of a lost art cannot file.32 A patent
application consists of a description of the subject matter sought
to be patented (called a specification), with or without drawings,
a fee, and an oath or declaration that the applicant is the first and
true inventor." The statute requires the applicant to describe his
invention in terms that will enable those skilled "in the art" to
practice his invention after the patent has expired. Moreover, the
specification must conclude with one or more claims or statements
that define the invention with particularity. It is customary to
speak of the specification as a general description, not only of the
invention, but also of the prior art. Thus one function of "the
claims" is to distinguish that part of the specification which the
applicant claims to be his particular contribution to the art.
This application is then filed with the United States Patent
Office where it is given a filing date and an application number
and is assigned to the docket of a patent examiner. Over a period
between eighteen months to several years, the patent examiner
and the applicant's counsel will intermittently engage in corre-
spondence concerning the merits of the application.
It is the obligation of the patent examiner to ensure that the
application is complete; that the specification enables those skilled
in the art to practice the invention; 4 that the invention is proper
subject matter of a utility patent;35 and that it is useful,3" new or
novel," and not obvious to those skilled in the art at the time of
the filing. It is in regard to the novelty requirement, especially,
that the generalist may be able to avoid loss to a client. An inven-
tion is not novel, and is therefore unpatentable, unless an applica-
tion is filed within a year of the time the invention is sold, used
I See, e.g., In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
31 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).
31 Id.; but see id. §§ 116-18.
u Id. §§ 112-15.
34 Id. § 112.
Id. § 101. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
3 Id. § 102.
- Id. § 103.
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publicly, or described in a printed publication. 9 This means that
if the inventor has an article published that describes his discov-
ery, he has one year from the date of publication in which to file
his patent application; by failure to so file, the invention falls into
the public domain, is no longer novel, and is no longer patentable.
If the application meets the statutory requirements to the
satisfaction of the patent examiner, the application is prepared to
be issued as a patent upon the payment of an issue fee.4" An appli-
cation may be drawn into contest interference at the time it is
prepared for issuance as a patent. Because only one patent may
issue for a single invention, interference proceedings are used to
determine who is the first, or true, inventor.41 It is in the area of
interference too, that proper, early counseling by a generalist may
prove to be of immense value. It is important to have a believable
record of what the inventor did in regard to his invention-and
when he did it-to use as evidence in an interference proceeding.
As soon as the lawyer becomes aware of inventive actions by a
client, the lawyer should suggest that third party affidavits and
other means of objective proof of inventorship be collected. Fortun-
ately, however, most applications are not contested by interference
and issue as a patent at this stage.
If the applicant is unable to convince the patent examiner of
the merits of his application (or in the rare case, is unable to
prevail in an interference), the applicant may abandon the appli-
cation, refile it, or initiate a complex series of appeals within the
Patent Office and ultimately to the federal courts.2
B. The Patent and the Courts
Once an application has been issued as a patent by the Patent
Office (no rights arise before issue), it becomes the business of the
courts to enforce the resultant rights of the patentee. Such pro-
ceedings are usually initiated by a patentee upon discovery that
someone else is improperly practicing or producing the patented
invention. After informal means of resolving the dispute have
failed, the patentee must maintain an action in the federal courts
to protect his interest. Success in such litigation may result in an
39 Id. § 102.
4D Id. § 151.
"1 Id. § 102(g); see also Martin, supra note 1.
42 See Lipscomb, Appeals from Patent Office Decisions, 50 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y
178 (1968).
[Vol. 77
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injunction against further infringement and recovery of up to three
times actual damages proven to be the result of past infringe-
ment.4 3 Patent infringement litigation is expensive and time-
consuming for both parties.
Upon being sued by the patentee, the party accused of patent
infringement has several defenses available to him: (1) that he is
not practicing the patentee's invention, that is the acts of the
alleged infringer are not within the scope of the inventor's patents
claims; (2) that the alleged infringer is practicing the invention
under a valid license (essentially a contract suit); (3) that because
the patentee is misusing his patent grant, the patentee has "un-
clean hands" and is not entitled to have his rights enforced;" and
(4) the patent or a portion of the patent is invalid." Invariably, the
first and fourth defenses will be advanced by the alleged infringer.
It is the fourth, in particular, that will be fatal to the patentee-or
at least to the patent in controversy. For once a patent has been
declared invalid, and is no longer subject to appeal, the patentee
loses all rights he may have had in that invention, and the subject
matter of the patent is irrevocably lost into the public domain.
In spite of a legislative presumption of the validity of a patent,
some courts have been far too quick to hold patents invalid. Even
one justice of the United States Supreme Court has remarked that
the only valid patent is one "which this court hasn't gotten its
hands on."4 Patentees have not fared well, not only in the Su-
preme Court, but also in several of the circuit courts of appeals. If
one assumes that only legitimately contestable patents result in
litigation, the patentees should have about a fifty-fifty chance of
success, notwithstanding the presumption of validity. In many ju-
risdictions, however, the pattern has been that the patentee never
prevails and contested patents are routinely invalidated. This situ-
ation is of considerable concern to a great many people.47
Moreover, in recent years the patentee has had to carry an
increasingly heavy burden to overcome the defense of misuse. It is
35 U.S.C. § 284 (1970); see generally id. §§ 281-86.
" Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
" 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 288 (1970); Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University of
Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
11 Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton, 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing).
47 One of the more objective appraisals of this judicial persuasion is found in
Fortas, The Patent System in Distress, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 810 (1971).
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a fundamental maxim of equity that one who seeks relief must
come into court with clean hands. On the basis of various anti-
trust theories the patentee has found that his hands have had to
become cleaner and cleaner to recover from an admitted infringer
of a valid patent. But the problems of a patentee with unclean
hands do not end with a finding of misuse; one shade beyond
misuse lurks possible violation of anti-trust law. 8 The treble dam-
ages remedy for violation of anti-trust statutes renders such ac-
tions similar in nature to a private attorney general suit and all but
discourages the patentee, out of fear of incurring anti-trust liabil-
ity, from attempting to protect his rights under patent.49
The current situation, then, is that a patentee seeking to en-
force his rights thereunder, risks having his patent invalidated,
having enforcement of it denied, and being found liable to his
erstwhile "infringer" for treble damages. The line from one to the
other is often difficult to spot. Many feel that the current
risk/reward ratio is too low to justify attempts at enforcement. 0
IV. COPYRIGHT
A. Kinds of Copyrights
A copyright may be obtained in the following subject matter
areas: (a) books; (b) periodicals, including newspapers; (c) lec-
tures, sermons, addresses (prepared for oral delivery); (d) dramatic
or dramatico-musical compositions; (e) musical compositions; (f)
maps; (g) works of art (and models and designs therefor); (h) re-
productions of works of art; (i) drawings or plastic works of a scien-
tific or technical nature; (j) photographs; (k) prints and pictorial
illustrations including prints or labels used for articles or
merchandise; (1) motion-picture photoplays; (m) motion pictures
other than photoplays; and (n) sound recordings. These classifica-
tions are not exclusive and: "shall not be held to limit the subject
matter of copyright. . . nor shall any error in classification invali-
" See, e.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). A
situation somewhat between misuse and anti-trust violation is found in LaPeyre v.
FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). An example of the other side of the line is Walker
Process Equip. v. Food Mach. & Chem., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
11 Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
See Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An
Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267 (1966); Forman, The Changing Characteristics
of Private Property, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 530 (1971); see also Fortas, supra note
47.
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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
date or impair the copyright protection secured under this title."5'
Thus, it can be seen that the area of coverage of the copyright
law is substantial. The various types of subjects need to be kept
-in mind because they often dictate the kind of protection available
to the copyright owner.52
B. Obtaining Copyright Protection
Section two of the federal Copyright Act provides that unpub-
lished works may be protected by state law.53 Consequently, most
unpublished works are protected by the business tort law of the
various states. While, some states label their form of protection the
law of literary property, others seem to have no name for the pro-
tection, but furnish it, nevertheless, on general equitable princi-
ples. Thus, one who takes liberties with an unpublished manu-
script can be stopped by an action filed in state courts. Federal law
also gives the "author" of certain limited kinds of unpublished
works the option of securing federal protection instead of relying
on state law. 4
For published works, however, there is only one method of
protection. It is in this area that there is the most confusion, and
the most damage is done (as contrasted with the usual failure to
prevent) by generalists. Copyright in published works is obtained
by the proper giving of notice of copyright on the work at the time
of publication. If the notice is omitted at first publication, rights
in the work are forever lost.5
If the copyright is secured only by publishing a work with
notice of a claim of copyright ("Copyright, 1973, Horseshoe
Publns., Inc."), what does the Copyright Office do?5" Doesn't it
examine applications for copyright? Nothing could be more dan-
gerously at odds with reality than that last notion. The Copyright
Office, a branch of the Library of Congress, is a registry much like
the records of deeds in local government. The chief officer of the
agency is called the Register of Copyrights. Although the Copy-
5 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1970). Classifications (g) and (h) provide an interesting over-
lap with design patent protection. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
52 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
'Id. § 2.
" Id; e.g., Marx v. United States, 6 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1938).
17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970). See, e.g., Moger v. WHDH, 194 F.Supp. 605 (D. Mass.
1961).
54 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1970).
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right Office sometimes undertakes to verify the form of claims sent
for registration, its function is purely ministerial rather than sub-
stantive. 7
While every generalization has its exceptions, it is accurate to
say that the Copyright Office's function is primarily limited to the
following: (1) collecting books for the Library of Congress (in most
cases, one or more samples of the work to be registered must ac-
company the registration form); (2) collecting the registration fee;"
and (3) issuing and recording certificates of registration, renewals,
and assignments. 9
There does not seem to be a.time limit within which the regis-
trant must send his copies of the work, the registration form, and
fee to the copyright office."0 The registration certificate is, however,
his ticket into court in the event of alleged infringement, and no
potential registrant would be wise to wait any longer than neces-
sary to file his claim.6 ' This ticket is valid for twenty-eight years,
and unlike the patent grant, it is renewable in the last year for
another twenty-eight years (fifty-six total) from the date of first
publication."2
C. Enforcing the Claim
In most situations, the protection afforded a copyright claim-
ant is recovery of lost profits and damages resulting from the un-
lawful copies, and an injunction against further copying, manufac-
ture, and sale by the infringer in the United States. 3 In situations
involving works that are meant to be performed, the performance
of such works may also be prohibited; sometimes it is public per-
formance alone which is prohibited; sometimes, public perform-
ance for profit."4 Unlike a patentee seeking damages for infringe-
ment of a utility patent, the copyright claimant need not show
actual damages in order to recover; the law provides minimum
statutory damages. 5
17 Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches v. Benrus Watch, 260 F.2d 637
(2d Cir. 1958).
- 17 U.S.C. §§ 201, 213, 215 (1970).
59 Id. §§ 201, 11, 25, 31.
10 Id. §§ 13, 14. See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30
(1939).
11 Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
62 17 U.S.C. §9 24, 25 (1970).
- Id. 99 101, 116.
1, Id. § 1(d), (e).
65 Id. § 101(b). This situation is somewhat ameliorated by the judicially
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Again unlike the patent law, the copyright certificate of regis-
tration is "prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.""0 This
means only that the facts within the statement are prima facie
truthful. It does not mean (or should not mean) that the copyright
is valid. If one considers that the Copyright Office is a registration
office, not an examination office where the substantive merits of
each application are carefully checked, this distinction is under-
standable. Thus, matters pertaining to validity of a copyright are
first tested judicially in an infringement action.
The primary burden upon the copyright claimant in an in-
fringement action is to establish that he is the originator of the
work, or that he claims under the originator. It has been observed
that Shakespeare's sonnets could be presently copyrighted by
someone, in fact, again originating the same verses. 7 Thus, one
need not show usefulness or novelty (much less unobviousness) to
have a valid copyright; one need only prove that one did not copy
the subject matter from another. This is not a terribly difficult
burden to carry, and provides a striking contrast with the patent
law."
On the other hand, the alleged infringer need only show: (1)
that he did not copy from the claimant; (2) that the claimant
copied from yet another (hence the claim is invalid); or (3) because
of the claimant's misuse of the copyright, that recovery by the
claimant and the other enforcement of his rights would be inequit-
able. 9
Nevertheless, unlike his patent counterpart, it is fairly rare for
the alleged infringer of a copyright to prevail under either a theory
of misuse or of invalidity, and almost as rare to prevail under the
theory that he did not copy from the claimant (which is not a valid
defense to patent infringement) .7 For these reasons, coupled with
minimum statutory damages, the length of grant, and the availa-
bility of criminal penalties," the copyright claimant finds himself
in an inordinately better position than does a patentee.
evolved doctrine of "fair use" which allows limited copying for certain purposes.
See, e.g., A. LATMAN, HowpLL's COPYRIHT LAW 151-54 (1962).
" 17 U.S.C. § 209 (1970).
" See, e.g., A. LATMAN, supra note 65, at 19-20.
u Id. at 1.
" See, e.g., Stone & McCarrick v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
7o See A. LATtmAN, supra note 65.
n 17 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See also, e.g., Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204
(9th Cir. 1938).
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V. FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRATION
A. Kinds of Marks
It was noted above that trademark protection is found not only
in state 2 and federal 3 statutes but also in the state common law.
For purposes of this section, however, it is convenient to focus on
the federal law since it is most carefully codified.
Under the federal statute, there are two basic registers of
marks: the principal register and the supplemental register. The
reason for the supplemental register is that common law rights of
trademark protection do not exist in many foreign nations, and in
some countries foreign copyrights by United States citizens may
be registered only if they could be registered in the United States.
It was early realized that many businesses have considerable pro-
prietary rights, which although enforceable at common law are
unregisterable under the technical requirements of the trademark
law. And since foreign protection for such rights was unavailable
in the absence of domestic trademark registrability, the supple-
mental register was provided. The supplemental register is similar
to, but in material respects inferior to, the principal register. Hav-
ing noted its existence and the basic reason therefore, however, it
will not be further discussed."
Marks are broken down under federal statute into the follow-
ing categories: (a) trademarks; (b) service marks; (c) collective
marks; and (d) certification marks." An example or two of each
should separate their boundaries enough to focus only on trade-
marks hereafter. They are, respectively: (a) "Bandaid" or "Kool-
Aid"; (b) "The Educational Testing Service"; (c) "The Dairy-
men's Association"; and (d) "Underwriter's Laboratories" or "The
Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval."
B. Registration
Unfortunately, because of the confusion caused, federal regis-
tration of trademarks takes place in the United States Patent Of-
fice. Registration is accomplished after an application is filed and
an examination procedure, somewhat more complex than that for
72 See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350-A (Model State Trademark Act, 1969).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-127 (1970).
7' Id. §§ 1091-96.
75 Id. §§ 1052-54.
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patents, is concluded.78 In spite of a more complex registration
procedure, trademark registration is less critical than patent regis-
tration:
Every right a patentee has is given to him by the Patent
Office. On the other hand, the acquisition of the right to exclude
others from the use of a trademark results from the fact of use
and the common law, independently of registration in the Pat-
ent Office. The happenstance [by Congressional fiat] that
trademarks are registered in the Patent Office should not result
in confusing the principles involved in dissimilar proceedings
with respect to wholly dissimilar rights. It is in the public inter-
est to maintain registrations of technically good trademarks on
the register so long as they are still in use. The register then
reflects commercial reality. . . trademark rights, unlike patent
rights, continue notwithstanding cancellation of those addi-
tional rights which the Patent Office is empowered by statute
to grant."
Although a bit more complex, the trademark application pro-
cedure is quite similar to that for patents.78 The biggest difference
is in the standards of registerability. First, federal registration of
a trademark is not based on an act of creation but rather on the
use of the mark to distinguish goods in interstate commerce. Sec-
ond, the technical requirements of trademark registration are that
the trademark sought to be registered: (1) is not confusingly simi-
lar to another mark used for similar goods; (2) is not either descrip-
tive of the goods or mis-descriptive (e.g., the mark, "Idaho Pota-
toes" would be either descriptive or misdescriptive for potatoes,
depending on where they came from); (3) is not deceptive; (4) does
not consist of a person's surname; and (5) variations on the above,
overlapping themes." Some of these restrictions can be waived,
however, if the applicant has a long record of exclusive use. For
example even though the marks contain personal surnames, Ford
Motor Company and Smith Bros. Cough Drops are valid trade-
marks due to their long record of exclusive use.8"
11 There are several inter partes proceedings in trademark matters. Under 15
U.S.C. § 1063 (1970), a party may oppose a registration by another; under section
1064, a party may file a petition to cancel another's registration. Neither of these
are possible in patent application proceedings.
Morehouse Mfg. V. Strickland, 407 F.2d 881, 888 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
78 See text accompanying notes 31-42, supra; 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970).
" Id. § 1052.
Id. (f).
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Assuming that an applicant can meet the technical require-
ments for registration of his mark, and assuming the applicant
does not get into a contest with another applicant or a prior regis-
trant,"' a certificate or registration that is "prima facie evidence of
the validity of the registration,"" is awarded. Registration is "con-
structive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership" for 20
years.13 Registration can be renewed by appropriate means every
20 years as long as the mark is in use as originally registered.8 For
example, if the Xerox Company should decide to expand into the
toothpaste market, they would have to file a new registration ap-
plication for the mark "Xerox" as applied to toothpaste-not a
renewal application.
C. Enforcement of Rights
Regardless of the source of trademark rights, infringement
suits are brought in the courts. A trademark is infringed when a
mark is applied to goods in commerce under circumstances in
which another has a superior right to use the same mark on those
particular goods. For example, "Xerox" is a perfectly good mark
for copying machines, but applied to anti-freeze it might very well
be found to infringe "Zerex" anti-freeze. All this is true even at
common law.
The question, then, becomes: what does federal registration
accomplish? Principal federal registration accomplishes two things
not accomplished by state common law: (1) it gives the registrant
the right to bring an action for infringement in federal court, re-
gardless of the amount in controversy, the citizenship of the parties
or actual competition between them;"' and (2) it is constructive
notice to everyone in the United States that the registrant is claim-
ing the right to use the mark throughout the country. After five
years of use and federal registration, the registration becomes
prima facie evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the
mark. 8 7
11 Id. § 1063-64; see also, e.g., Coahoma Chem. v. Smith, 113 U.S.P.Q. 413
(Comr., 1957).
15 U.S.C. § 1058b (1970).
Id. §§ 1072, 1058(a).
Id. § 1059.
Id. §§ 1114(1), 1116-21.
Id. § 1115(a).
Id. § 1115(b).
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The implications of federal registration for a small business
that may be using the mark in a limited (as yet) locality are seri-
ous. And every lawyer should be aware of these implications since
small businesses are most apt to pick a generalist as counsel in
such matters. Small business should be warned of the nasty prob-
lems that can arise from commencing use of! a mark without first
searching the federal register. Moreover, large amounts of time and
money may be spent to acquire a good reputation in a mark only
to subsequently discover that another has superior rights.
The remedies available to a trademark registrant for infringe-
ment are the following: (1) injunctive relief; (2) damages; (3)
profits; and (4) costs and attorneys fees. 8 Remedies for trademark
infringement are broader than those for patent infringement in
that lost profits can be collected for the former; but they are nar-
rower than copyright and utility patent remedies since neither
minimum damages nor treble damages are recoverable for trade-
mark infringement.
VI. STATE PROTECTION
A. Tort Actions
It is a basic proposition of intellectual and industrial property
law that one may duplicate, manufacture, and sell any item that
he finds in the market place unless it is covered by a patent or
copyright." If there is to be recovery by a party with superior rights
under either patent or copyright the goods must bear notice.
Thus, one can be reasonably safe in copying any commodity not
bearing such notice if he is able, by his own efforts, to duplicate
it.
The thrust, therefore, of a state action for infringement of
one's trade secret or common law literary property rights is that
the other party has resorted to means other than those noted above
in order to copy it. Any action such as stealing formulas or bribing
or hiring trusted employees to obtain trade secrets, may be reme-
died at state law in an action for damages, lost profits, injunction,
83 Id. §§ 1114(1), 1116-21. For a discussion of misuse in trademark proceedings,
see Field, The Fourth Dimension in Labeling, 25 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 347 (1970).
9 E.g., Tabor v. Hoffman, 119 N.Y. 30, 23 N.E. 12 (1889).
93 35 U.S.C. § 287 (1970); 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970); 15 U.S.C. § 1111 (1970).
Compare 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1970) and 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
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or a combination thereof." There are various limitations on the
ability to recover: (1) an employee is generally free to sell his
services where he pleases;" (2) a secret, in order to be protected,
must be treated as such by the party claiming that it has been
improperly obtained;93 (3) volunteers of ideas to others have little
right to recover if their idea is used. 4
Another general rule of intellectual and industrial property
law is that one may distinguish his goods in commerce as he
pleases. Thus the thrust of an action for unfair competition (as the
common law equivalent of state and federal trademark registration
acts) can be that the competitor has not distinguished his goods
from another's, or that he is, in fact, attempting to palm off his
goods as those of another, thereby getting a free ride on another's
good name. The major limitations on recovery for failure to distin-
guish goods are: (1) anyone may use a common descriptive term
(geographical or otherwise) to denote the nature of his goods;" (2)
a first user has superior rights;9 (3) a trademark cannot be used
to get an indefinite monopoly in the structure of a commodity;"
or (4) there must in fact be competition between the goods."
B. Misuse as a Defense
Insofar as the focus of most state actions in the area of intellec-
tual and industrial property is equitable (i.e., for an accounting
and injunction), the defense of unclean hands is a potent tool for
the admitted infringer of another's rights. As was previously dis-
cussed in relation to patents, rights that are exercised in such a
way as to violate public policy as manifested by common or statu-
" E.g., Downey v. General Foods, 37 App. Div. 2d 250, 323 N.Y.S.2d 578
(1971), rev'd 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).
92 E.g., Schmidt, Inventions and Proprietary Information: A Tug of War Be.
tween Employees and Employers, 7 L. NOas 39 (1971).
'3 E.g., Downey v. General Foods, 37 App. Div. 2d 250, 323 N.Y.S.2d 578
(1971), rev'd; 31 N.Y.2d 56, 286 N.E.2d 257, 334 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1972).
" 37 App. Div. 2d at 258, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 586-87.
95 A contrary rule would be unworkable, and this is recognized and codified in
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (1970).
" E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970).
For an excellent policy discussion of a well-known factual situation, see
Sylvania Elec. Prod. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 144 F. Supp. 112 (D.N.J. 1956). See
also In re Leblanc, 429 F.2d 989 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
" This situation, of course, only obtains until there is a registration under state
or federal law that provides constructive notice regardless of actual competition.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1970).
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tory law are unenforceable in equity. There are cases, for example,
in which recovery on the theory of unfair competition was denied
where the party seeking the aid of the court was shown to be
deceiving the public with the very labels upon which his mark
appeared."
VII. CONCLUSION: THE FUNCTION OF THE GENERALIST
As pointed out in the first two sections of this article, a sub-
stantial amount of the law of intellectual and industrial property
is state law. It is in the area of state law that the generalist is as
apt to be at least as competent as a specialist in a metropolis in
another state; even in large metropolitan areas, generalists serve
an important function in intellectual and industrial property
law.00 With a minimum appreciation of some constitutional prob-
lems and of the thrust of the anti-trust laws, a generalist is as
capable of handling a good will transfer for a business, of aiding
in prosecution of a defendant for industrial espionage, or of enforc-
ing a contract (with, perhaps, the exception of patent license
agreement) ' as a patent or copyright attorney. Depending on the
subject matter involved and the geographical scope and location
of a business, he may be more so.
11 See, e.g., Strey v. Devine's Inc., 217 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1954); Worden v.
California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516 (1903).
11 Martin, supra note 1. It is also worthy of note that only in regard to patent
office patent prosecutions are special qualifications needed. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 31-
33 (1970). Compare 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.343, and 2.12 (1974).
"I2 See Baxter, supra note 50.
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